Howard. For some, running unsealed will be necessary, but the great majority of users shouldnt even consider it as an option. sudo bless --folder /[mountpath]/System/Library/CoreServices --bootefi --create-snapshot. I don't have a Monterey system to test. Also SecureBootModel must be Disabled in config.plist. Big Sur, however, will not allow me to install to an APFS-encrypted volume on the internal SSD, even after unlocking said volume, so its unclear whether thats a bug or design choice. In Release 0.6 and Big Sur beta x ( i dont remember) i can installed Big Sur but keyboard not working (A). Howard. At some point you just gotta learn to stop tinkering and let the system be. Hello, you say that you can work fine with an unsealed volume, but I also see that for example, breaking the seal prevents you from turning FileVault ON. Do you know if theres any possibility to both have SIP (at least partially) disabled and keep the Security Policy on the Reduced level, so that I can run certain high-privileged utilities (such as yabai, a tiling window manager) while keeping the ability to run iOS apps? OCSP? That leaves your System volume without cryptographic verification, of course, and whether it will then successfully update in future must be an open question. And putting it out of reach of anyone able to obtain root is a major improvement. If you put your trust in Microsoft, or in yourself in the case of Linux, you can work well (so Im told) with either. Id be interested to hear some old Unix hands commenting on the similarities or differences. I have rebooted directly into Recovery OS several times before instead of shutting down completely., Nov 24, 2021 6:23 PM in response to Encryptor5000, Dec 2, 2021 8:43 AM in response to agou-ops. You are using an out of date browser. SIP # csrutil status # csrutil authenticated-root status Disable This will get you to Recovery mode. Yes Skip to content HomeHomeHome, current page. So whose seal could that modified version of the system be compared against? You must log in or register to reply here. The sealed System Volume isnt crypto crap I really dont understand what you mean by that. You like where iOS is? Hi, When Authenticated Root is enabled the macOS is booted from a signed volume that is cryptographically protected to prevent tampering with the system volume. I have tried to avoid this by executing `csrutil disable` with flags such as `with kext with dtrace with nvram with basesystem` and re-enable Authenticated Root Requirement with the `authenticated-root` sub-command you mentioned in the post; all resulted in vain. I suspect that youll have to repeat that for each update to macOS 11, though, as its likely to get wiped out during the update process. hf zq tb. macOS Big Sur Recovery mode If prompted, provide the macOS password after entering the commands given above. As Apples security engineers know exactly how that is achieved, they obviously understand how it is exploitable. Ive been running a Vega FE as eGPU with my macbook pro. Mac added Signed System Volume (SSV) after Big Sur, you can disable it in recovery mode using follow command csrutil authenticated-root disable if SSV enabled, it will check file signature when boot system, and will refuse boot if you do any modify, also will cause create snapshot failed this article describe it in detail No, but you might like to look for a replacement! disabled SIP ( csrutil disable) rebooted mounted the root volume ( sudo mount -o nobrowse -t apfs /dev/disk1s1 /Users/user/Mount) replaced files in /Users/user/Mount created a snapshot ( sudo bless --folder /Users/user/Mount/System/Library/CoreServices --bootefi --create-snapshot) rebooted (with SIP still disabled) Hello all, I was recently trying to disable the SIP on my Mac, and therefore went to recovery mode. Additionally, before I update I could always revert back to the previous snapshot (from what I can tell, the original snapshot is always kept as a backup in case anything goes wrong). You can have complete confidence in Big Sur that nothing has nobbled whats on your System volume. im able to remount read/write the system disk and modify the filesystem from there, but all the things i do are gone upon reboot. Hell, they wont even send me promotional email when I request it! Thankfully, with recent Macs I dont have to engaged in all that fragile tinkering. Howard. Sadly, everyone does it one way or another. However it did confuse me, too, that csrutil disable doesn't set what an end user would need. . Boot into (Big Sur) Recovery OS using the . You have to assume responsibility, like everywhere in life. But then again we have faster and slower antiviruses.. Its authenticated. Howard. Although I havent tried it myself yet, my understanding is that disabling the seal doesnt prevent sealing any fresh installation of macOS at a later date. provided; every potential issue may involve several factors not detailed in the conversations 1. disable authenticated root The SSV is very different in structure, because its like a Merkle tree. csrutil authenticated-root disable as well. Howard. Solved it by, at startup, hold down the option key, , until you can choose what to boot from and then click on the recovery one, should be Recovery-"version". Still stuck with that godawful big sur image and no chance to brand for our school? Howard. Apple disclaims any and all liability for the acts, omissions and conduct of any third parties in connection with or related to your use of the site. Thank you yes, thats absolutely correct. Maybe when my M1 Macs arrive. Thank you. Thanks, we have talked to JAMF and Apple. If you really want to do that, then the basic requirements are outlined above, but youre out almost on your own in doing it, and will have lost two of your two major security protections. Nov 24, 2021 6:03 PM in response to agou-ops. I am currently using a MacBook Pro 13-inch, Early 2011, and my OS version is 10.12.6. I think youll find that if you turn off or disable all macOS platform security, starting an app will get even faster, and malware will also load much more quickly too. Great to hear! You may also boot to recovery and use Terminal to type the following commands: csrutil disable csrutil authenticated-root disable -> new in Big Sur. Thats a path to the System volume, and you will be able to add your override. It's much easier to boot to 1TR from a shutdown state. (ex: /System/Library/Frameworks/NetworkExtension.framework/Versions/A/Resources/Info.plist). Ill report back when Ive had a bit more of a look around it, hopefully later today. I also expect that you will be able to install a delta update to an unsealed system, leaving it updated but unsealed. cstutil: The OS environment does not allow changing security configuration options. Just great. Why choose to buy computers and operating systems from a vendor you dont feel you can trust? However, even an unsealed Big Sur system is more secure than that in Catalina, as its actually a mounted snapshot, and not even the System volume itself. But why the user is not able to re-seal the modified volume again? Thank you. would anyone have an idea what am i missing or doing wrong ? Every single bit of the fsroot tree and file contents are verified when they are read from disk." We've detected that JavaScript is disabled in your browser. This can take several attempts. An how many in 100 users go in recovery, use terminal commands just to edit some config files ? And when your system is compromised, what value was there in trying to stop Apple getting private data in the first place? Theres a world of difference between /Library and /System/Library! Ive seen many posts and comments with people struggling to bypass both Catalinas and Big Surs security to install an EDID override in order to force the OS recognise their screens as RGB. I seem to recall that back in the olden days of Unix, there was an IDS (Intrusion Detection System) called Tripwire which stored a checksum for every system file and watched over them like a hawk. Once youve done it once, its not so bad at all. This site contains user submitted content, comments and opinions and is for informational purposes You can verify with "csrutil status" and with "csrutil authenticated-root status". Click the Apple symbol in the Menu bar. Every security measure has its penalties. She has no patience for tech or fiddling. a. In outline, you have to boot in Recovery Mode, use the command The best explanation I've got is that it was never really intended as an end user tool, and so that, as it's currently written, to get a non-Apple internal setting . Thanx. Howard. Thank you. `csrutil disable` command FAILED. Encrypted APFS volumes are intended for general storage purposes, not for boot volumes. In the end, you either trust Apple or you dont. 4. mount the read-only system volume Im hoping I dont have to do this at all, but it might become an issue for some of our machines should users upgrade despite our warning(s). Also, type "Y" and press enter if Terminal prompts for any acknowledgements. That said, would you describe installing macOS the way I did with Catalina as redundant if my Mac has a T2 chip? Show results from. To make that bootable again, you have to bless a new snapshot of the volume using a command such as sudo bless --folder / [mountpath]/System/Library/CoreServices --bootefi --create-snapshot Longer answer: the command has a hyphen as given above. 5. change icons But I wouldnt have thought thered be any fundamental barrier to enabling this on a per-folder basis, if Apple wanted to. All that needed to be done was to install Catalina to an unencrypted disk (the default) and, after installation, enable FileVault in System Preferences. It had not occurred to me that T2 encrypts the internal SSD by default. Im sure there are good reasons why it cant be as simple, but its hardly efficient. Hoakley, Thanks for this! csrutil enable prevents booting. Without in-depth and robust security, efforts to achieve privacy are doomed. In Mojave and Catalina I used to be able to remove the preinstalled apps from Apple by disabling system protection in system recovery and then in Terminal mounting the volume but in Big Sur I found that this isnt working anymore since I ran into an error when trying to mount the volume in Terminal. Howard. It is dead quiet and has been just there for eight years. Disabling SSV on the internal disk worked, but FileVault cant be reenabled as it seems. It may appear impregnable in Catalina, but mounting it writeable is not only possible but something every Apple updater does without going into Recovery mode. csrutil authenticated-root disable thing to do, which requires first to disable FileVault, else that second disabling command simply fails. Why I am not able to reseal the volume? Restart your Mac and go to your normal macOS. Search. I booted using the volume containing the snapshot (Big Sur Test for me) and tried enabling FIleVault which failed. 6. undo everything and enable authenticated root again. This to me is a violation. SIP is locked as fully enabled. This is a long and non technical debate anyway . Incidentally, I am in total sympathy with the person who wants to change the icons of native apps. REBOOTto the bootable USBdrive of macOS Big Sur, once more. Immutable system files now reside on the System volume, which not only has complete protection by SIP, but is normally mounted read-only. Its a good thing that Ive invested in two M1 Macs, and that the T2 was only a temporary measure along the way. Increased protection for the system is an essential step in securing macOS. If you really feel the need or compulsion to modify files on the System volume, then perhaps youd be better sticking with Catalina? does uga give cheer scholarships. Howard. I'm trying to boor my computer MacBook Pro 2022 M1 from an old external drive running High Sierra. Sorry about that. The bputil man page (in macOS, open Terminal, and search for bputil under the Help menu). I have the same problem and I tried pretty much everything, SIP disabled, adding to /System/Library/Displays/Contents/Resources/Overrides/DisplayVendorID-#/DisplayProductID-*, This site contains user submitted content, comments and opinions and is for informational purposes only. Im sorry, I dont know. You can also only seal a System volume in an APFS Volume Group, so I dont think Apple wants us using its hashes to check integrity. Assuming you have entered the Recovery mode already, by holding down the Power button when powering-up/rebooting. Certainly not Apple. Im not sure what your argument with OCSP is, Im afraid. Ah, thats old news, thank you, and not even Patricks original article. Then reboot. I imagine theyll break below $100 within the next year. I think Id stick with the default icons! omissions and conduct of any third parties in connection with or related to your use of the site. See: About macOS recovery function: Restart the computer, press and hold command + R to enter the recovery mode when the screen is black (you can hold down command + R until the apple logo screen appears) to enter the recovery mode, and then click the menu bar, " Utilities >> Terminal". You have to teach kids in school about sex education, the risks, etc. Or could I do it after blessing the snapshot and restarting normally? any proposed solutions on the community forums. Running multiple VMs is a cinch on this beast. Youve stopped watching this thread and will no longer receive emails when theres activity. Block OCSP, and youre vulnerable. Then you can boot into recovery and disable SIP: csrutil disable. Im a bit of a noob with all this, but could you clarify, would I need to install the kext using terminal in recovery mode? ). The MacBook has never done that on Crapolina. Thanks for your reply. Im sorry, I dont know. How can a malware write there ? If you want to delete some files under the /Data volume (e.g. My recovery mode also seems to be based on Catalina judging from its logo. In this step, you will access your server via your sudo -enabled, non-root user to check the authentication attempts to your server. as you hear the Apple Chime press COMMAND+R. Big Sur really isnt intended to be used unsealed, which in any case breaks one of its major improvements in security. I hope so I ended up paying an arm and a leg for 4 x 2 TB SSDs for my backups, plus the case. Enabling FileVault doesnt actually change the encryption, but restricts access to those keys. I mean the hierarchy of hashes is being compared to some reference kept somewhere on the same state, right? @JP, You say: When I try to change the Security Policy from Restore Mode, I always get this error: Howard. And you let me know more about MacOS and SIP. However, it very seldom does at WWDC, as thats not so much a developer thing. You dont have a choice, and you should have it should be enforced/imposed. There are a lot of things (privacy related) that requires you to modify the system partition Open Utilities Terminal and type csrutil disable Restart in Recovery Mode again and continue with Main Procedure Main Procedure Open Utilities Terminal and type mount A list of things will show up once you enter in (mount) in Terminal Write down the disk associated with /Volumes/Macintosh HD (mine was /dev/disk2s5) Trust me: you really dont want to do this in Big Sur. Every time you need to re-disable SSV, you need to temporarily turn off FileVault each time. In T2 Macs, their internal SSD is encrypted. Do so at your own risk, this is not specifically recommended. SSV seems to be an evolution of that, similar in concept (if not of execution), sort of Tripwire on steroids. Theres no encryption stage its already encrypted. Ensure that the system was booted into Recovery OS via the standard user action. I dont think its novel by any means, but extremely ingenious, and I havent heard of its use in any other OS to protect the system files. For the great majority of users, all this should be transparent. [] (Via The Eclectic Light Company .) This thread has a lot of useful info for supporting the older Mac no longer supported by Big Sur. I have a 2020 MacBook Pro, and with Catalina, I formatted the internal SSD to APFS-encrypted, then I installed macOS, and then I also enabled FileVault. Have you contacted the support desk for your eGPU? Further details on kernel extensions are here. Of course there were and are apps in the App Store which exfiltrate (not just leak, which implies its accidental) sensitive information, but thats totally different. (I imagine you have your hands full this week and next investigating all the big changes, so if you cant delve into this now thats certainly understandable.) [] those beta issues, changes in Big Surs security scheme for the System volume may cause headaches for some usersif nothing else, reverting to Catalina will require []. To remove the symlink, try disabling SIP temporarily (which is most likely protecting the symlink on the Data volume). I wouldn't expect csrutil authenticated-root disable to be safe or not safe, either way. not give them a chastity belt. I have now corrected this and my previous article accordingly. csrutil disable. I use it for my (now part time) work as CTO. Individual files have hashes, then those hashes have hashes, and so on up in a pyramid to reach the single master Seal at the top. It is that simple. The seal is verified each time your Mac starts up, by the boot loader before the kernel is loaded, and during installation and update of macOS system files. Of course you can modify the system as much as you like. Apple disclaims any and all liability for the acts, modify the icons Maybe I am wrong ? Disable FileVault if enabled, boot into the Recovery Mode, launch Terminal, and issue the following (this is also known as "disabling SSV"): Boot back into macOS and issue the following: Navigate to the "mount" folder and make desired changes to system files (requires "sudo" privileges), then commit the changes via: Obviously, you need to take general precautions when modifying any system file, as it can break your installation (as has been true for as long as macOS itself has existed). I figured as much that Apple would end that possibility eventually and now they have. Howard. The main protections provided to the system come from classical Unix permissions with the addition of System Integrity Protection (SIP), software within macOS. Unfortunately I cant get past step 1; it tells me that authenticated root is an invalid command in recovery. Thus no user can re-seal a system, only an Apple installer/updater, or its asr tool working from a sealed clone of the system.